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Entrapment is a well-established defense to a criminal 
charge, but it is also a "relatively limited defense." United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,435 (1973). The common 
law did not recognize an entrapment defense, adopting the 
view that courts should "not look to see who held out the 
bait, but [rather] who took it." People v. Mills, 70 N.E.2d 786, 
789 (N.Y. 1904). Nevertheless, the defense took root in 
several state courts in the late 19th Century. Subsequently, 
"[b]eginning with the decision in Sorrells v. United States in 
1932, the development of the law of entrapment became 
largely an activity of the federal courts, with the states then 
adopting the doctrine thereby created." 1 LaFave & Scott, 
, .~_Substantive Criminal Law§ 502.2(a), at 597 (1986). j(d!J? A Biblical analogy is sometimes used to describe entrap-
f ment. "And the Lord God said unto woman, what is this 
~ thou hast done? And the woman said, The serpent be-
guiled me, and I did eat." Genesis 3:13. In Sherman v. . 
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 376 (1958). the U.S. Supreme 
Court may have been alluding to this reference when it 
commented: "Thus the Government plays on the weak-
nesses of an innocent party and beguiles him into commit-
ting crimes which he otherwise would not have attempted." 
See also Groot, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I (Without 
Scienter) Did Eat - Denial of Crime and the Entrapment 
Defense, 1973 U. Ill. L.F. 254. 
TYPES OF CASES 
The entrapment defense has been raised in some notori-
ous trials, such as Abscam and the DeLorean case. See 
Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of 
Entrapment, 91 Yale L.J. 1565 (1982) (Abscam involved an 
FBI sting operation in which a number of Congressmen 
were convicted); Reaves, Squashing Bugs, 70 A.B.A.J. 30 
(Oct. 1984) ("John DeLorean was acquitted of drug traffick-
ing despite apparently incriminating videotapes."); 
Chambers et al., In the Name of the Father, Time, Jan. 23, 
1995, at 38 (discussing an alleged attempted assassination 
of Louis Farrakhan by Malcolm X's daughter and whether 
she was entrapped by an FBI informant). The defense is 
most often raised in drug-related offenses: 
The defense of entrapment has been asserted in the 
context of a wide variety of criminal activity, including 
prostitution, alcohol offenses, counterfeiting, price con-
trolling, and, probably most spectacularly, bribery of 
public officials. However, the great majority of the 
cases in which an entrapment defense is interposed 
involve a charge of some drug offense. 1 LaFave & 
Scott, § 502.2, at 598 (1986). 
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The use of decoys, deceptions, "sting" operations, infor-
mants, undercover agents, and other forms of police strata-
gems are often necessary and legally permissible. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that "the in-
filtration of drug rings and a limited participation in their un-
lawful present practices" is one of the "only practicable 
me.ans of detection." Russell, 411 U.S. at 432. See also 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 ("Criminal activity is such that 
stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal 
of the police officer."); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 
435, 441 (1932) ("Artifice and stratagem may be employed 
to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises."). 
"Of course evidence that Government agents merely af-
forded an opportunity or facilities for the commission of the 
crime would be insufficient to warrant such an [entrapment] 
instruction." Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 66 
(1988). 
[A]n agent deployed to stop the traffic in illegal drugs 
may offer the opportunity to buy or sell drugs . . . . In 
such a typical case, or in a more elaborate "sting" op-
eration involving government-sponsored fencing 
where the defendant is simply provided with the oppor-
tunity to commit a crime, the entrapment defense is of 
little use because the ready commission of the crimi-
nal act amply demonstrates the defendant's predispo-
sition. Jacobson v. United States, 503 U.S. 540, 549-
50 (1992). 
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In short, the police may employ a variety of stratagems that 
rely on deception to catch,criminals;but they maynotin=--
duce law-abiding citizens to commit crimes and then prose-
cute them. Entrapment, therefore, requires the drawing of a 
line "between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap 
for the unwary criminaL" Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372. The 
Model Penal Code commentary puts it this way: 
Particularly in-the-e[lforcement of laws against vice, 
such as !iquOf and ~arcotic laws, it is all but impossi-
ble to obtain' evidenc'e for prosecution save by the use 
of d8C()Y,~~- -ft1.~£e7~e rarely complaining witnesses; 
the partJ~ipan,t~, ii -he crime are satisfying their de-
sir!ils~ ')flt'1.e1ai[li!"is, for example, to obtain evidence 
ag~insti=trseller of n rcotics, it will typically be neces-
s"!-{X}J~JfS~,-i,-,;.,•'J·t'""t pf law enforcement to ma~e !he 
pllrCI'f~rs-E:n:rntl;~of cbtfrse, to conceal that assoc1at1on 
from the seller. Cooperation with the criminal and 
something less than absolute truth is required in many 
other kinds of cases where the police have an "inside 
man" in a group of would-be lawbreakers. The law 
must therefore attempt to distinguish between those 
deceits and persuasions that are permissible and 
those that are not. Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised Comments 
pt. 1, §2.13, at408 (1985). 
SUBJECTIVE TEST 
Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 454 (1932), is 
generally regarded as the genesis of the modern entrap-
ment defense. The Sorrells Court stated that "[e]ntrapment 
is the conception and planning of an offense by an officer, 
and his procurement of its commission by one who would 
not have perpetrated it except for the trickery, persuasion or 
fraud of the officer." In another passage, the Court wrote 
that entrapment occurs 
when the criminal design originates with the officials of 
the Government, and they implant in the mind of an in-
nocent person the disposition to commit the alleged of-
fense and induce its commission in order that they 
may prosecute. ld. at 442. 
The Sorrells approach has come to be known as the sub-
jective approach or "origin of intenf' test. The focus is on 
the subjective state of mind of the accused - the defen-
dant's predisposition or propensity to commit the offense. 
See Russell, 411 U.S. at 433 ("[T]he principal element in the 
defense of entrapment [is] the defendant's predisposition to 
commit the crime."). In contrast, the minority rule, known as 
the objective approach, focuses on the conduct of the po-
lice, rather than the defendant's state of mind. 
The subjective approach has been consistently affirmed 
by the U.S. Supreme Court and is the rule in the majority of 
states, including Ohio. 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2, at 599 
("This subjective approach to entrapment--- is adhered to 
by the federal courts as well as a majority of the state 
courts."). 
UNDERLYING RATIONALE 
The Sorrells Court grounded the entrapment defense on 
congressional intent: "We are unable to conclude that it 
was the intention of the Congress in enacting this statute 
[the National Prohibition Act] that its processes of detection 
and enforcement should be abused by the instigation by 
government officials of an act on the part of persons other-
wise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to 
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punish them." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 448. See also 
Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372 ("Congress could not have in-
tended that its statutes were to be enforced by tempting_ in-
nocent persons into violations."). 
In effect, the Court read an implied exception into the 
federal penal code. Accordingly, state courts are not bound 
by this aspect of federal substantive criminal law. As the 
Ohio Supreme Court noted: "Since defining the entrapment 
defense under either of the [two] standards does not impli-
cate federal constitutional principles, we are not bound by 
Sorrells and its progeny and are free to adopt either stan-
dard." State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St3d 187, 190-91,449 N.E.2d 
1295 (1983). 
TWO-PRONGED TEST -
The subjective approach "has two related elements: [1] 
government inducement of the crime, and [2] a lack of pre-
disposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the 
criminal conduct." Matthews, 485 U.S. at 63. If the ac-
cused was induced and was not predisposed, entrapment is 
established. There is a tendency, however, to collapse the 
two prongs into a single prong dealing only with predisposi-
tion. "[l]nducement is significant chiefly as evidence bearing 
on predisposition: the greater the inducement, the weaker 
the inference that in yielding to it the defendant demonstrat-
ed that he was predisposed to commit the crime in ques-
tion." United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F. 3d 1196, 1200 
(7th Cir. 1994) (en bane). 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
Sherman v. United States 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Sorrells subjective 
test in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958). A 
government informant met Sherman at a doctor's office 
where they both were participants in a narcotics treatment 
program. The informer made numerous requests, citing his 
personal suffering, before Sherman acquiesced and ob-
tained drugs. Concurring, Justice Frankfurter wrote: 
"Particularly reprehensible in the present case was the use 
of repeated requests to overcome petitioner's hesitancy, 
coupled with appeals to sympathy based on mutual experi-
ences with narcotics addiction." ld. at 384. 
Moreover, Sherman did not profit from these sales, and 
no narcotics were found in his apartment when it was 
searched. According to the Court, these facts illustrate the 
"evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to over-
come. The government informer entices someone attempt-
ing to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an illegal 
sale but also into returning to the habit of use." ld. at 369. 
The Court ruled that the police conduct constituted entrap-
ment as a matter of law. Justice Frankfurter advocated the 
replacement of the subjective approach with an objective 
test. 
United States v. Russell 
In United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973), an un-
dercover agent supplied propanone, a necessary ingredient 
in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine ("speed"). 
Although possession of propanone was not illegal, it was 
very difficult to obtain. Rejecting Russell's entrapment argu-
ment, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the subjective ap-
proach: 
Sorrells is a precedent of long standing that has al-
ready been once reexamined in Sherman and implicit-
ly there reaffirmed. Since the defense is not of a con-
stitutional dimension, Congress may address itself to 
the question and adopt any substantive definition of 
the defense that it may find desirable. ld. at 433. 
1A:!n dissent, Justice Stewart commented that the "objective 
.f Dapproach to entrapment ... is the only one truly consistent 
with the underlying rationale of the defense." ld. at 441. 
Hampton v. United States 
In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), the 
government's involvement in the criminal enterprise was 
more pervasive than it had been in Russell. The police in-
formant supplied Hampton with heroin, which was not only 
illegal but also constituted the corpus delicti of the sale for 
which Hampton was convicted. The plurality opinion once 
again reaffirmed the subjective test and then went on to re-
ject a due process entrapment defense. Hampton.conced-
ed that he did not qualify for entrapment under the subjec-
tive approach and therefore focused instead on the due 
process argument. Justice Brennan, in dissent, argued for 
the objective approach and criticized the plurality for not ex-
tending the entrapment defense to the Hampton facts: 
Where the Government's agent deliberately sets up 
the accused by supplying him with contraband and 
then bringing him to another agent as a potential pur-
chaser, the Government's role has passed the point of 
toleration .... The Government is doing nothing less 
than buying contraband from itself through an interme-
diary and jailing the intermediary. ld. at 498. 
Jacobson v. United States 
In the Supreme Court's most recent decision, Jacobson 
"." v. United States, 503 U.S. 540 (1992), the defendant assert-
(~.ad the entrapment defense to a charge of receiving child 
pornography through the mail. The Court agreed with 
Jacobson, once again applying the subjective approach: 
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government 
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in 
an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a 
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime 
so that the Government may prosecute. ... Where the 
Government has induced an individual to break the 
law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as it 
was in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to 
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached 
by Government agents. ld. at 548-49. 
In 1984 Jacobson had ordered two pornographic maga-
zines from a California bookstore, at a time when receipt of 
these magazines was legal. Postal inspectors later found 
his name on the mailing list for this bookstore. For the next 
2 and 1/2 years, two government agencies (the Postal 
Service and the Customs Service) made repeated efforts, 
through five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal, to 
ascertain Jacobson's willingness to break a new federal law 
by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children through 
the mail. 
These agencies finally piqued Jacobson's interest, and 
he ordered a magazine. When he received the magazine, 
he was arrested and his house searched. The search dis-
( t ;losed only the two original magazines and the material 
sent by the federal agencies. The Supreme Court ruled as 
a matter of law that Jacobson had been entrapped. 
Whether Jacobson expands the entrapment defense is 
controversial. The dissent argued that the majority opinion 
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changed the defense by requiring the prosecution to prove 
not only that an accused was predisposed to commit the 
crime before the opportunity to commit the crime arose, but 
also before the Government came on the scene: "[f) his 
holding changes entrapment doctrine. Generally, the in-
quiry is whether a suspect is predisposed before the gov-
ernment induces the commission of the crime, not before 
the Government makes initial contact with him." ld. at 556-
57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent believed that the 
majority position "redefines 'predisposition,' and introduces 
a new requirement that Government sting operations have 
a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before contacting a 
suspect." ld. at 556. The majority disagreed, asserting that 
its.interpretation was not new: 
The dissent is mistaken in claiming that this is an inno-
vation in entrapment law and in suggesting that the 
Government's conduct prior to the moment of solicita-
tion is irrelevant. ... Indeed, the proposition that the 
accused must be predisposed prior to contact with law 
enforcement officers is so firmly established that the 
Government conceded the point at oral argument .... 
ld. at 549 n. 2. 
After Jacobson, the Seventh Circuit, en bane, declared 
that "[c]ases both in this and in other circuits, ... recognize 
that Jacobson has changed the landscape of the entrap-
ment defense." United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 
1196, 1198 (7th Cir. 1994). The court went on to state: 
Predisposition is not a purely mental state, the state of 
being willing to swallow the government's bait. It has 
positional as well as dispositional force. . ... The de-
fendant must be so situated by reason of previous 
training or experience or occupation or acquaintances 
that it is likely that if the government had not induced 
him to commit the crime some criminal would have 
done so; only then does a sting or other arranged 
crime take a dangerous person out of circulation. ld. 
at 1200. 
PRIVATE INDUCEMENTS 
The defense of entrapment does not extend to induce-
ments made by a private individual not working as or in con-
junction with a government agent. See State v. Hsie, 36 
Ohio App.3d 99, 103, 303 N.E.2d 89 (1973) ("At most, de-
fendant claims he was motivated by the urgings of a mutual 
friend but not by any inducement of the state's agent."); 
United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir. 
1994) ("There is no defense of private entrapment."); United 
States v. Mers, 701 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir. 1983); Henderson 
v. United States, 237 F.2d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1956) ("Well 
settled ... it is that the doctrine of entrapment does not ex-
tend to acts of inducement on the part of a private citizen 
who is not an officer of the law."). 
Generally, the defense is available only when the induce-
ment originated with law enforcement officers. E.g., 
Jacobson (Postal Service and Customs Service agents); 
Russell (undercover agent for Bureau of Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drugs); Sorrells (prohibition agent). This cate-
gory extends to paid informants. E.g., Matthews (FBI infor-
mant); Hampton (DEA informant). As the Supreme Court 
noted in Sherman, the "Government cannot make such use 
of an informer and then claim disassociation through igno-
rance." 356 U.S. at 369. The Court also observed: 
"Although he was not being paid, [the informer] was an ac-
tive government informer who had but recently been the in-
42 13!CS CIJ t ~:~ 
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stigator of at least two other prosecutions." ld. at 373-74. 
See also State v, Good, 11 0 Ohio ApJJ. 415, 439; 165 
N.E.2d 28 (1960) (dissent) ("The State in this case cannot 
claim disassociation from the work of its informer and agent, 
it being quite clear that the informer ... was acting under the 
instructions of the Police Department although its members 
may not have known about every detail of his conduct to-
ward the defendant."). 
DERIVATIVE ENTRAPMENT 
The Seventh Circuit has recognized "derivative entrap-
ment," which arises when a private person is entrapped and 
then acts as an agent or conduit for police efforts to entrap 
others. The court wrote: · 
[W]hile there is no defense of either private entrapment 
or vicarious entrapment, there is a defense of deriva-
tive entrapment: when a private individual, himself en-
trapped, acts as agent or conduit for governmental ef-
forts at entrapment, the government as principal is 
bound. This principle follows as we said from the un-
questioned principle that the entrapment defense will 
lie whether the government uses its own employee as 
the stinger or an informant. U.S. v. Hollingsworth, 27 
F.3d 1196, 1204 (7th Cir. 1994). 
SERIOUS CRIME EXCEPTION 
The entrapment defense may be unavailable in certain 
types of prosecutions. In Sorrells the Supreme Court re-
marked: "We have no occasion to consider hypothetical 
cases of crimes so heinous or revolting that the applicable 
law would admit of no exceptions." 287 U.S. at 451. The 
Model Penal Code, although adopting the objective ap-
proach, also recognized an exception; the defense is "un-
available when causing or threatening bodily injury is an el-
ement of the offense charged and the prosecution is based 
on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person 
other than the person perpetrating the entrapment." Model 
Penal Code 2.13(3) (1962). 
This exception is based on the notion that it "is unlikely 
that a law abiding person could be persuaded by any tactics 
to engage in [violent] behavior, and a person who can be 
persuaded to cause such injury presents a danger that the 
public cannot safely disregard." Model Penal Code and 
Commentaries: Official Draft and Revised Comments pt. 1, 
§ 2.13, at 420 (1985) ·(also noting the adoption of this ex-
ception in several state criminal codes). 
OBJECTIVE TEST 
The objective approach, advocated by Justice Roberts in 
a separate opinion in Sorrells, and by Justice Frankfurter in 
a concurring opinion in Sherman, is sometimes called the 
"police conduct" test. This approach can be traced to 
Justice Brandeis' celebrated dissent in Casey v. United 
States, 276 U.S. 413, 425 (1928), in which he wrote: "This 
prosecution should be stopped, not because some right of 
[the accused's] has been denied, but in order to protect the 
Government. To protect it from illegal conduct of its officers. 
To preserve the purity of its courts." The majority of com-
mentators favor the objective approach and the Model 
Penal Code adopted it. Nevertheless, it remains a minority 
position. 
Police conduct 
In contrast to the subjective approach, which focuses on 
the accused's predisposition, the objective approach focus-
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es on the government's conduct in inducing the defendant's 
participation in the crime. "This test shifts attention from the 
record and predisposition of the particular defendant to t~e 
conduct of the police and the likelihood, objectiv~l~ consid-
ered, that it would entrap only those ready and Willing to 
commit crime." Sherman, at 384 (Frankfurter, J. concurring). 
Under this view, the issue is whether the police's conduct 
would induce a reasonable (hypothetical) person to break 
the law. Thus, the Model Penal Code frames the issue as 
whether law enforcement officials employed "methods of 
persuasion or inducement that create a substantial risk that 
such an offense will be committed by persons other than 
those who are ready to commit it." Model Penal Code 
2.13(1 )(1Jf(1962). 
Rationale 
Under the objective approach, the underlying basis for 
the entrapment defense is not the "innocence" of the ac-
cused but rather the prohibition of "unlawful governmental 
activity in instigating crime." Russell, 411 U.S. at 442 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Sherman, 356 U.S. at 
380 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Public confidence in the 
fair and honorable administration of justice, upon which ulti-
mately depends the rule of law, is the transcending value at 
stake."). 
Furthermore, this rationale requires the court, and not the 
jury, to decide the issue: "[S]uch a judgment, aimed at 
blocking off areas of impermissible police conduct, is appro-
priate for the court and not the jury." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 
385 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). In Sorrells, Justice 
Roberts put it this way: "The protection of its own functions 
and the preservation of the purity of its own temple belongs 
only to the court. It is the province of the court and the court 
alone to protect itself and the government from such prosti-
tution of the criminal law." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 457. 
According to its proponents, the objective approach is su-
perior to the subjective approach for several reasons. First, 
the legislative intent rationale, the basis for the subjective 
approach, is a "sheer fiction." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 379. 
"[T]he courts refuse to convict an entrapped defendant, not 
because his conduct falls outside the proscription of the 
statute, but because, even if his guilt be admitted, the meth-
ods employed on behalf of the Government to bring about 
conviction cannot be countenanced." ld. at 380. 
Second, the subjective test permits the introduction of 
prejudicial evidence of bad character, which may force the 
accused to abandon the defense. "The danger of prejudice 
... is evident. The defendant must either forego the claim 
of entrapment or run the risk that, in spite of instructions, the 
jury will allow a criminal record or bad reputation to weigh in 
its determination of guilt of the specific offense of which he 
stands charged." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 383. Or, if the de-
fense is pursued, an otherwise innocent person may be 
convicted. "The possibility that no matter what his past 
crimes and general disposition the defendant might not 
have committed the particular crime unless confronted with 
inordinate inducements, must not be ignored." ld. at 383. 
Third, the subjective test provides no guidance for the 
police: "Equally important is the consideration that a jury 
verdict, although it may settle the issue of entrapment in the 
particular case, cannot give significant guidance for official 
conduct for the future." Sherman, 356 U.S. at 385. Because 
the objective approach is designed to control police con-
duct, rather than determine the innocence of a particular de-
fendant, it shares some of the attributes of the exclusionary 
rule in search and seizure and confession cases. 1 LaFave 
& Scott, § 5.2(c), at 602 ("So viewed, the entrapment de-
fense appears to be a procedural device (somewhat like the 
Fourth Amendment and Miranda exclusionary rules) for de-
.:;::,+erring undesirable governmental intrusions into the lives of 
/J ;itizens."). 
OHIO RULE 
By the 1980s, several Ohio courts of appeal had adopted 
the subjective approach. E.g., State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio 
App.2d 212,396 N.E.2d 786 (1977); State v. Hsie, 36 Ohio 
App.2d 99, 303 N.E.2d 89 (1973); State v. McDonald, 32 
Ohio App.2d 231, 289 N.E.2d 583 (1972). 
State v. Doran 
The Ohio Supreme Court did not address the issue com-
prehensively until State v. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d 187, 190, 
449 N.E.2d 1295 (1983), where the Court noted that it had 
"not yet defined which test is applicable in this state." Prior 
cases had focused on other entrapment issues. See State 
v. Minnker, 27 Ohio St.2d 155, 271 N.E.2d 821, 825 (1971) 
(no error in failing to instruct on entrapment) ("[l]t is not en-
trapment for the officer to place himself in a position to ap-
prehend those participating in the criminal conduct, and he 
may use inducement and set traps to apprehend them."). 
The Supreme Court explicitly embraced the subjective 
approach: "The defense of entrapment is established 
where the criminal design originates with the officials of the 
government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent 
person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and in-
duce its commission in order to prosecute." Doran, at 190. 
. In addition, the Court cited a number of the traditional ob-
~ )ections to the objective approach to support its decision. 
·· First, an "innocenf' person could be convicted under the ob-
jective standard: 
[T]he objective test focuses upon the nature and de-
gree of the inducement by the government agent and 
not upon the predisposition of the accused. Thus, 
even though the accused may not be individually pre-
disposed to commit the crime, the inducement may not 
be the type to induce a reasonably law abiding citizen, 
and thus lead to the conviction of an otherwise inno-
cent citizen. ld. at 191. 
Second, the objective test could also lead to the acquittal 
of the guilty. By ignoring the predisposition of the individual 
accused, "a 'career' criminal, or one who leaves little or no 
doubt as to his predisposition to commit a crime, will avoid 
conviction if the police conduct satisfies the objective test." 
ld. at 191. See also Russell, 411 U.S. at 434 ("Nor does it 
seem particularly desirable for the law to grant complete im-
munity from prosecution to one who himself planned to 
commit a crime, and then committed it, simply because the 
government undercover agents subjected him to induce-
ments which might have seduced a hypothetical individual 
who was not so predisposed."). 
Third, the objective test could adversely effect the accu-
racy of the fact-finding process: "Since most of these in-
ducements will be offered in secrecy, the trial will more than 
·. likely be reduced to a swearing contest between an ac-~ ~used claiming that improper inducements were used and a 
police officer denying the accused's exhortations." Doran, at 
191. In contrast, under the subjective test, ''the fact-finding 
process is enhanced because evidence of predisposition 
may come from objective sources." ld. at 192. 
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The Court reaffirmed Doran in State v. Italiano, 18 Ohio 
St.3d 38, 42, 479 N.E.2d 857 (1985) ("It is not entrapment 
... when it is shown that the accused was predisposed to 
commit the offense, and the state merely provided the ac-
cused with the opportunity to commit the offense.") . 
Some appellate cases appear to collapse the two-
pronged test into the predisposition issue. State v. Seebeck-
Horstman, 67 Ohio App.3d 443, 446, 587 N,E.2d 359 
(1990) ("The ultimate issue is whether a preponderance of 
evidence establishes that the accused lacked the predispo-
sition to commit the offense with which he is charged."); 
State v. Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14,437 N.E.2d 1202 
(1980) ("Absence of 'predisposition' on the part of the ac-
cused is the principal element of the entrapment defense."). 
Defendants have prevailed in only a few of the reported 
cases. E.g., State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio App.2d 212, 219, 396 
N.E.2d 786 (1977) (court described the police's conduct as 
"entrapment by duress or to coin a phrase, aggravated en-
trapment"); State v. Sarto, 36 Misc. 184,304 N.E.2d 919, 
920 (CP 1973) ("[nhere is not the slightest suggestion that 
this defendant had ever participated in dealing in marijuana, 
except for his own use, either before or after this alleged of-
fense."). 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
In contrast to the objective view, entrapment under the 
subjective approach raises a jury issue. See Matthews, 485 
U.S. at 63 ("The question of entrapment is generally one for 
the jury, rather than for the court."); Masciale v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 386, 829 (1958) ("While petitioner present-
ed enough evidence for the jury to consider, they were enti-
tled to disbelieve him in regard to [the informant] and so find 
for the Government on the issue of guilt."). 
Only in clear cases will the issue be decided by the court. 
Sherman was one such case: "The case at bar illustrates 
an evil which the defense of entrapment is designed to 
overcome. The government informer entices someone at-
tempting to avoid narcotics not only into carrying out an ille-
gal sale but also into returning to the habit of use." 356 U.S. 
at 376. Jacobson was another. 
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court held the jury instruc-
tion defective because it failed to correctly allocate the bur-
den of persuasion. Doran, 5 Ohio St.3d at 191 ("A jury in-
struction which fails to allocate any burden of proof on the 
affirmative defense of entrapment is inherently misleading 
and confusing and is prejudicial error."). See also Ohio Jury 
Instruction § 411.25. 
An instruction is not required, however, if insufficient evi-
dence of entrapment is in the record. See State v. Dotson, 
35 Ohio App.3d 135, 139, 520 N.E.2d 240 (1987) Uury in-
struction not required where neither prosecution or defense 
evidence raised entrapment; "There is nothing to indicate 
that the agent did more than supply a possible market, and 
that market was immediately developed by the defendant 
into an actual sale."); State v. Birns, 1 0 Ohio App.2d 1 03, 
226 N.E.2d 149 (1967) (instruction not required because 
there was "no evidence to suggest even entrapmenf'), cert 
denied, 389 U.S. 1038 (1968). 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
In other jurisdictions that adopt the subjective view, the 
accused has the burden of establishing the fact of govern-
ment inducement. 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.2(f)(e) (1986). 
Once this threshold is satisfied, the burden shifts to the gov-
ernment to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In Jaeobsonthe UcS. Supreme Court commented: 
'Where the Government has induced an individual to break 
the law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, ... the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to 
first being approached by Government agents." Jacobson, 
503 U.S. at 548-49. 
Ohio rule 
In Ohio, however, the burden of persuasion (by a prepon-
derance of the evidence) for all affirmative defenses is allo-
cated to the defendant by RC 2901.05(C)(2). The statute 
defines an affirmative defense as one "involving an excuse 
or justification peculiarly within the knowledge of the ac-
cused, on which he can fairly be required to adduce sup-
po-rting evidence." In Doran, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled 
that entrapment was an affirmative defense within the 
meaning of this statute. First, the Court noted that entrap-
ment is a "classic confession and avoidance" and thus an 
excuse or justification defense. 5 Ohio St.3d at 193. 
Second, proof of entrapment is peculiarly within the ac-
cused's knowledge: "The key consideration with the subjec-
tive test is whether the accused was predisposed to commit 
the offense. While proof of predisposition may come from 
objective sources, only the accused possesses the actual 
knowledge concerning his predisposition to commit the of-
fense." ld. 
Finally, it is not unfair to allocate the burden of persua-
sion to the accused. 
The accused, as a participant in the commission of the 
crime, will be aware of the circumstances surrounding 
the crime, and is at no disadvantage in relaying to the 
fact-finder: his version of the crime as well as the rea-
son he was not predisposed to commit the crime. 
Moreover, the accused will certainly be aware of his 
previous involvement in crimes of a similar nature 
which may tend to refute the accused's claim that he 
was not predisposed to commit the offense. ld. 
See also State v. Cheraso, 43 Ohio App.3d 221, 222, 540 
N.E.2d 326 (1988) ("Entrapment is an affirmative defense 
and appellant has the burden of establishing this defense by 
a preponderance of evidence."). 
EVIDENCE ISSUES 
Character evidence 
As a general rule, character (propensity) evidence is in-
admissible under Evid. H. 404(A). An entrapment defense, 
however, necessarily raises issues concerning the defen-
dant's character and commission of "other acts." See 1 
Giannelli & Snyder, Ohio Evidence § 404.1 (3d ed 1996). 
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Sorrells, "if the defen-
dant seeks acquittal by reason of entrapment he cannot 
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his 
own conduct and predisposition as bearing upon that issue. 
If in consequence he suffers a disadvantage, he has 
brought it upon himself by reason of the nature of the 
defense." Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451-52. 
Nevertheless, this evidence rule has been characterized 
as the "greatest faulf' of the subjective approach and an "in-
discriminate attitude toward predisposition evidence is by no 
means a necessary feature of the subjective test." Park, 
The Entrapment Controversy, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 163, 272 
(1976). A similar caution about the admission of character 
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evidence is found in Doran, where the Court expressed 
concern about the"scope of admissible evidence on the 
issue of an accused's predisposition." The Court wrote: 
While evidence relevant to predisposition should be 
freely admitted, judges should be hesitant to allow evi- ( 
dence of the accused's bad reputation, without more, 
on the issue of predisposition. Rather, while by no 
means an exhaustive list, the following matters would 
certainly be relevant on the issue of predisposition: (1) 
the accused's previous involvement in criminal activity 
of the nature charged, (2) the accused's ready acqui-
escence to the inducements offered by the police; (3) 
the accused's expert knowledge in the area of the 
criminal activity charged; (4) the accused's ready ac-
cess to contraband; and (5) the accused's willingness 
to involve himself in the criminal activity. ld. at 191-92. 
Other relevant factors include an accused's own admissions 
of past deeds or future plans and the results of a search 
that shows the defendant is involved in a "course of ongoing 
criminal activity." 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f) (1), at 607. 
Numerous Ohio cases address this evidence issue. E.g., 
State v. Smith, 92 Ohio App.3d 172, 176-78, 634 N.E.2d 
659 (1993) (applying the Doran factors); State v. Cheraso, 
43 Ohio App.3d 221, 222, 540 N.E.2d 326 (1988) ("Once 
[entrapment] is established, the state can rebut the entrap-
ment defense by showing that the defendant was predis-
posed to commit the crime."); Columbus v. Corne, 7 Ohio 
App.3d 344, 345-46, 455 N.E.2d 696 (1982) ("But, after the 
prosecution has rested 1its case and the defense of entrap-
ment is raised and pursued by the accused, then, the prose-
cution may introduce rebuttal evidence in an effort to show 
the accused's predisposition to commit the crime.") ; State v. 
Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14, 437 N.E.2d 1202 (1980) (In \_ 
an entrapment case, ''the defendant waives his right to pro-
hibit the state from showing his 'predisposition' and makes 
predisposition relevant for the state to show on rebuttal."). 
Expert Testimony 
Several federal courts have ruled that the defendant may 
introduce expert testimony concerning his susceptibility to 
inducement. See U.S. v. Mclernon, 7 46 F.2d 1 098, 115 
(6th Cir. 1984) ("expert testimony concerning a defendant's 
predisposition may be invaluable in an entrapment case."); 
U.S. v. Hill, 655 F.2d 512 (3d Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Benveniste, 
564 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1977); Graham, Handbook of 
Federal Evidence§ 702.4, at 631 n.8 (3d ed. 1991 ). A few 
Ohio cases have addressed this issue: 
[The] defendant shall be permitted to introduce expert 
psychiatric testimony as to any susceptibility to influ-
ence or suggestion as relevant to the predisposition 
issue . . . . The expert shall not however testify as to 
the actions of government agents or their effect upon 
the defendant's susceptibility nor as to the ultimate 
issue of the existence of entrapment which is within 
the province of the jury. State v. Woods, 20 Misc.2d 1, 
3, 484 N.E.2d 773 (CP 1984). 
See also State v. Dapice, 57 Ohio App.3d 99, 105, 566 
N.E.2d 1261 (1989) ("There is some authority that expert 
testimony on the issue of predisposition may be admitted. 
However, admission of such testimony is a matter left to the 
discretion of the trial court."). 
INCONSISTENT DEFENSES 
"The traditional view has been that the defense of entrap-
ment is not available to one who denies commission of the 
criminal act with which he is charged, for the reason that the 
denial is inconsistent with the assertion of such a defense." 
1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f)(3), at 609. 
However, in Matthews v. United States, 485 U.S: 58 
(~'1988), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "even if the de-
. endant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is en-
titled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is suffi-
cient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find en-
trapment." Matthews, an employee of the Small Business 
Administration, was charged with accepting a bribe. The 
trial court refused to instruct on entrapment, as requested 
by Matthews, because Matthews would not admit commit-
ting all the elements of the crime, in particular the mens rea 
element. (Matthews claimed the money was a personal loan 
unrelated to S.B.A. business). 
The Supreme Court held that denying the charge and as-
serting the affirmative defense of entrapment is permissible. 
The prosecution argued that entrapment presupposed the 
commission of the crime and a jury could not logically con-
clude that Matthews had !;loth failed to commit the crime 
and been entrapped. The Court, however, saw nothing un-
usual about pleading inconsistent defenses. In an earlier 
case, Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313 (1896), the 
Court had held that a murder defendant was entitled to both 
a manslaughter and self-defense instruction: "The affirma-
tive defense of self-defense is, of course, inconsistent with 
the claim that the defendant killed in the heat of passion." 
Matthews, 485 U.S. at 64. 
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court appears to have taken 
a different approach, noting that "[w]hen an accused raises 
the defense of entrapment, the commission of the offense is 
(Jf'dmitted" and "entrapment is the classic confession and 
. - - avoidance." Doran, 5 Ohio St. 3d at 193. Numerous Ohio 
cases follow this view. E.g., State v. Dapice, 57 Ohio App.3d 
99, 105, 566 N.E.2d 1261 (1989) ("In the use of entrapment 
as an affirmative defense, the defendant admits that he 
committed the offense, but challenges the origin of the in-
tent."); State v. Johnson, 4 Ohio App.3d 308, 310, 448 
N.E.2d 520 (1982) ("Entrapment is a 'confession and avoid-
ance' defense in which the defendant admits committing the 
acts charged"); State v. Savage, 1 Ohio App.3d 13, 14, 437 
N.E.2d 1202 (1980) ("Where a defendant, after the state 
has rested its case in chief, affirmatively pursues the de-
fense of entrapment he concedes that he committed the 
crime and puts in issue whether he had a predisposition to 
commit the crime."); State v. Hsie, 36 Ohio App.2d 99, 303 
N.E.2d 89 (1973) ("The defense of entrapment is in the na-
ture of a confession and avoidance and it assumes that he 
act charged as a public offense was committed."); State v. 
Good, 110 Ohio App.2d 415, 430, 165 N.E.2d 28, 28 (1960) 
(Entrapment not available "when he denies that he commit-
ted such acts. Such claims ... are inconsistent with the 
claim that he neither had for sale nor sold narcotics and 
where his theory of the case is that he is innocent."). 
Doran, however, was decided before Matthews, and it is 
unclear whether the Doran dictum will be upheld when th·e 
Ohio Supreme Court directly considers the issue. 
Nevertheless, the Doran approach raises "serious constitu-
' _+ional questions concerning whether a defendant may be re-
\ 0 1uired, in effect, to surrender his presumption of innocence 
and his privilege against self-incrimination in order to plead 
entrapment." 1 LaFave & Scott, § 5.2(f)(3), at 609 (1986). 
Furthermore, permitting "inconsistent" defenses does not 
put the prosecution at a disadvantage. In a concurring opin-
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ion in Matthews, Justice Scalia wrote that "the defense of 
entrapment will rarely be genuinely inconsistent with the de-
fense on the merits, and when genuine inconsistency exists 
its effect in destroying the defendant's credibility will suffice 
to protect the interests of justice." 485 U.S. at 67 . 
GUILTY PlEAS 
A guilty plea waives the right to appeal the issue of en-
trapment. E.g., United States v. Nunez, 958 F.2d 196, 200 
(7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Sarmiento, 786 F.2d 665, 
668 (5th Cir. 1986). 
INFORMANT'S IDENTITY 
The identity of an informant is subject to a limited privi-
lege. If the defendant makes a showing that the identity of 
the informant is necessarf to the defense, the privilege may 
be breached. E.g., State v. Butler, 9 Ohio St.3d 156, 459 
N.E.2d 536 (1984) (showing not made); State v. Williams, 4 
Ohio St.3d 74, 446 N.E.2d 779 (1983). See also 1 Giannelli 
& Snyder, Ohio Evidence§ 5.1 (3d ed 1996). 
DUE PROCESS 
In addition to the entrapment defense, which is a sub-
stantive criminal law issue, the due process clause has 
been cited as the source of a constitutional "entrapment'' 
defense involving "outrageous police conduct." In United 
States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,430 (1973), the defendant 
asked the Court to recast the entrapment defense, arguing 
that the defense should rest on due process grounds: 
"[Russell's] principal contention is that the defense should 
rest on constitutional grounds. He argues that the level of 
Shapiro's involvement ... was so high that a criminal prose-
cution for the drug's manufacture violated the fundamental 
principles of due process." Russell argued that this defense 
should apply when "the criminal conduct would not have 
been possible had not an undercover agent 'supplied an in-
dispensable means to the commission of the crime that 
could not have been obtained otherwise, through legal or il-
legal channels."' ld. at 431. The undercover agent supplied 
propanone, a necessary ingredient in the illicit manufacture 
of methamphetamine ("speed"). The chemical, however, is 
harmless and its possession was not illegal. In addition, the 
drug was available from other sources. 
The Court rejected Russell's argument but left open the 
possibility of a due process defense in a later case: "While 
we may some day be presented with a situation in which 
the conduct of law enforcement agents is so outrageous 
that due process principles would absolutely bar the govern-
ment from invoking judicial process to obtain a conviction, .. 
. the instant case is distinctly not of that breed." ld. at 431-
_32 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), holding 
that stomach pumping a suspect to obtain drugs "shocks 
the conscience" and thus violates due process). 
Nevertheless, Justice Rehnquist, the author of the above 
passage, divorced himself from his dictum in Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976), arguing in his plu-
rality opinion that a defendant has only the substantive crim-
inal law entrapment defense: "If the police engage in illegal 
activity in concert with a defendant beyond the scope of 
their duties the remedy lies, not in freeing the equally culpa-
ble defendant, but in prosecuting the police under the ap-
plicable provisions of state or federal law." 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell, along with 
Justice Blackmun, wrote that he was "unwilling to join the 
plurality in concluding that, no matter what the circum-
stances, neither dUe process prinCiples nor ot.n· sLIJ5e-rJisory 
power could support a bar to conviction in any case where 
the Government is able to prove predisposition." ld. at 495. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Stewart and Marshall, dissented 
but agreed with the Powell opinion on the due process 
issue. ld. at 497 ("I agree with Mr. Justice Powell that 
Russell does not foreclose imposition of a bar to conviction 
- based upon our supervisory power or due process princi-
ples -where the conduct of law enforcement authorities is 
sufficiently offensive, even though the individuals entitled to 
invoke such a defense might be 'predisposed."'). 
The federal appellate courts are divided on whether a 
due process defense even exists. In United States v. ·· 
Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit be-
came one of the few courts to bar prosecution on due proc-
ess grounds. lf1 that case the informant suggested the es-
tablishment of a drug manQfacturing operation, located a 
site for the operation, supplied the equipment and materials, 
and ran the lab. In contrast, the Sixth Circuit ruled in United 
States v. Tucker, 28 F.3d 1420, 1428 (6th Cir. 1994), that 
there was ·no due process defense. "[W]e hold that a defen-
dant whose defense sounds in inducement is, by congres-
sional intent and Supreme Court precedent, limited to the 
defense of entrapment and its key element of predisposi-
tion. Defendants may not circumvent this restriction by 
couching their defense in terms of 'due process' or 'supervi-
sory powers."' 
In Doran the Ohio Supreme Court commented on this 
issue: "An accused may put the conduct of the police or 
their agent into issue by arguing that such conduct was so 
outrageous as to violate due process. . . . In our view, a 
'due process' defense is analytically distinct from the de-
fense of entrapment." 5 Ohio St.3d at 192 n. 4 (citing 
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). Some appellate 
cases, however, have "refused to recognize the due proc-
ess defense of outrageous government conduct separate 
from the entrapment defense." State v. Jurek, 52 Ohio 
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App.3d 30, 33, 556 N.E.2d 1191 (1 989), motion granted, 46 
Ohio St.3d 704, 545 N.E.2d 1282 (1989), dismissed, 47 
Ohio St.3d 711, 548 N.E.2d 241 (1989). See also State v. 
Latina, 13 Ohio App.3d 182, 185, 468 N.E.2d 1139 (1 984) 
("The Ohio courts have not recognized a due process de- 1 
tense of outrageous government conduct separate from the!( 
entrapment defense."). 
Another court has disagreed. State v. Miller, 11 93 WL 
294806 (App) ("[W]e hold again as we have held before, 
that a due process defense outside the defense of entrap-
ment may be made in Ohio."). In State v. Metcalf, 60 Ohio 
App.2d 212, 219,396 N.E.2d 786 (1977), the court de-
scribed the police conduct as "entrapment by duress or to 
coin a phrase, aggravated entrapment." The court entered 
a judgment of acquittal, commenting that under these cir-
cumstances the subjective test is "unwaiianted." ld. at 219. 
This case comes very close to a due process analysis. The 
court added: "Whenever the government undertakes to en-
trap by duress such conduct must fail as a matter of sound 
public policy. Duress by law enforcement personnel is as 
hostile to the preservation of liberty as is the use by the gov-
ernment of force to extract a confession of crime from an in-
nocent person." ld. 
If the police induce violence or threats of violence against 
innocent parties, use contingent fee arrangements with in-
formants, initiate sexual relations to induce the crime, or 
offer exorbitant financial rewards, a due process defense 
may be successful. 1 LaFave & Scott,§ 5.2(g); Whitebread 
& Slobogin, Criminal Procedure ch. 19 (3d ed. 1993). 
REFERENCES 
1 LaFave & Scott, Substantive Criminal Law§ 5.2 (1 986). 
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 209 (1 984). 
Marcus, The Entrapment Defense (1989). 
Barker, Entrapment in Ohio, 17 Akron L. Rev. 709 (1984). 
